The theory of watershed water pollution
The watershed water environment, as a common item of weight summation technology, has a natural geographical feature that is unidirectionally upstream and downstream. The one-way externality of the water pollution problem in the basin makes the use of pure polluter pay and beneficiary compensation policies face obvious obstacles. First, due to the one-way externality of water pollution in the basin, a single pollutant discharge permit or sewage charge system is economically inefficient. To solve this problem, researchers such as Mount Gomery (1972) and Tietenherg (1974) have proposed that independent licensing systems should be established for the location of pollution sites. However, the problem is that the independent licensing system designed according to the different locations of sewage disposal and its market transactions are extremely complicated and cannot be carried out in specific operations. So far, there have been few successful cases in the world. Therefore, the market for emissions trading in the basin has special characteristics. It is difficult to achieve effective pollution control by means of simple sewage permit or sewage charges.
Secondly, regardless of negative externality correction or property rights definition, the corresponding water pollution control system needs to operate well under decentralized information and has good incentive compatibility characteristics. In China, environmental management adopts a localized management model under the hierarchical management structure. The local government of Liuzhen is a rational individual, and its policy intensity and incentive intensity are subject to the policy goal of maximizing local income.
Due to the existence of one-way externalities, there is no strong incentive between the upper and lower reaches of the basin to correctly disclose pollution information, and the maximum revenue in the basin is the policy goal. Therefore, asymmetric information and local income maximization under the bureaucracy are the biggest impetus or the biggest constraint that really affects the effectiveness of watershed pollution control. Therefore, in the absence of appropriate financing incentives and pollution control system reform, sewage tax and Emissions trading market transactions are difficult to use effectively in river basin water pollution control.
In addition to the one-way externality characteristics, the natural geographical properties of the water environment in the basin also affect the formation and treatment of water pollution in the basin. Generally speaking, the upper [source] of the catching area is mostly in the mountainous area, compared with the downstream of the river basin. The economic development conditions such as transportation and communication are often poor, the economic carrying capacity is weak, and the economic development conditions are insufficient. For example, according to the “polluter pays, The principle of pollution control, the ability to pay for upstream pollution control is much lower than the downstream. From the perspective of public goods, due to the one-way external characteristics of the water basin, the pollution, protection or treatment of the water environment by the anchor will obviously affect the whole basin. In particular, downstream, that is, providing water environment public goods for the whole basin. Upstream pollution control and soil and water conservation, etc., form a foreign priest's 艾 地 地 地 沛 谕 谕 谕 谕 谕 谕 谕 谕 和 和 和 和 和 和 和but under the current system, whether it is well-protected watershed environment, or has contaminated water basin management, restore the ecological environment Basin, most of the funds needed have to bear its own place. thus, the upstream aspects of watershed pollution control The financing ability is poor, the residents, enterprises and the government have weak ability to pay; on the other hand, there is a serious cost-income imbalance in pollution control. The combination has greatly weakened the incentives for upstream financing, governance and supervision of emissions. At the same time, the cost-benefit imbalance under the “polluter pays†principle provides incentives for water-borne public goods in the “free-rider†consumption basin downstream of the basin. As a result, the lack of upstream financing, governance and supervisory incentives has constrained downstream non-exclusive consumption, which is the underlying cause of water pollution in the basin.
Regular pieces. It refers to parts that are often used, such as high frequency, large loss of equipment and cheap univalent, such as vulnerable parts, large consumption parts, and key equipment, and so on.
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